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Introduction 
Over a number of years a number of questions in adult education have resisted a search for a 
more comprehensive answer. These concern, for example, the following. Firstly, adults who 
have returned to education frequently express their deep satisfaction with the learning 
experience and inform evaluators that their self-confidence and esteem has been greatly 
enhanced. What does this enhancement involve?  Does this gain in sense of self reflect the 
increasing importance of credentials in the labour market, a successful adaptation to, often 
classed and gendered, social norms, a new form of reflexive individualism or provide more 
evidence of the pervasive use of therapeutic language in society ? The predominance of the 
theme of ‘self esteem’ in the interviews undertaken as part of an ongoing EU funded study of 
access and retention of non-traditional students in higher education  (RANLHE, 2009) and the 
search for useful sensitising concepts for this research (SCUTREA, 2009) has forced us to 
reconsider what this refrain in student interviews might mean. With an interest in critical 
pedagogy we have been looking for ways of empirically deepening our understanding of what 
they mean when they make such observations.  
 
Secondly, having engaged in a study of the ideas of Jürgen Habermas (Fleming, 2009; 
Murphy & Fleming, 2006) and those of John Bowlby (2008a) we have intuitively grasped that 
there is a connection between Bowlby’s Attachment Theory (with the importance it gives to 
reciprocal and close relationships of care and security inducing attention) and Habermas’s 
Theory of Communicative Action on the other hand (with its imperative of engaging in 
discourses that are egalitarian, free and democratic). How these might be connected is an 
ongoing project. Thirdly, there is an ongoing need to rescue the concept of lifelong learning 
(Field, 2007; Finnegan, 2008; Illeris, 2004) from domination by the one-dimensional 
economic (neo-liberal) version in command in many policy discourses and re-establish a 
critical theory of lifelong learning.  
 
We propose to explore the ideas of Axel Honneth as a way of developing a dialogue about 
these issues. Honneth was a student of Jürgen Habermas at Munich and has worked at the 
Frankfurt School (Institute for Social Research) at the University of Frankfurt and at the Free 
University in Berlin. 
 
His current work on developing a theory of recognition attempts to both further develop 
critical theory and rethink how structure and agency are related. The central insight of 
Habermas and others that human development can only be achieved intersubjectively is 
expanded by Honneth to emphasise the key role of recognition and respect in this process. 
Respect is at the core of Habermas’ theory of Communicative Action and distortions in 
communication are forms of disrespect. For Honneth the need and desire for recognition 
precedes communication and the theory relies less on cognitive rationality calling for ‘critical 
theory to focus on a term that has a decidedly subjective, non-economic, psychological and 
cultural character’ (Alexander & Pia Lara, 1996, p.129). Rocognition rather than 
communication is at the centre of his model. 
 
In contrast to the ideas of Foucault, Bourdieu and to a lesser extent Habermas, these ideas 
have had almost zero impact on educational philosophy, research and practice, with a small 
number of notable exceptions (Huttunen, 2008 & Murphy, 2008; 2009) on. This paper will 
attempt to rectify this by proposing that the ideas of Honneth have significant implications for 
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understanding how adults experience returning to education; as a sensitising concept for 
researching the experience of non-traditional students in HE; and for developing a critical 
theory of lifelong learning.  
 
Honneth’s Remapping of Critical Theory:  
Honneth’s recent work amounts to an ambitious project to reconfigure and reanimate critical 
theory. He clearly aligns himself with this tradition and argues that the purpose of critical 
philosophy is to investigate social problems in their historical context with emancipatory 
intent. One is reminded of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach where the point is not just to 
understand (as objects of contemplation) but to change the world: 
Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the  
point is to change it. (Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (reference)). 
 
Nonetheless, he is explicit that although his work is deeply embedded in this political and 
philosophical tradition his work on recognition marks a significant departure from Marxism 
in general and early Frankfurt School philosophy in particular.  Marxist theory is criticised by 
Honneth for having little grasp of the role of values and ethics in political and everyday life 
and of succumbing to a version of economic utilitarianism. Writers within this broad tradition 
who have sought to understand how the moral imagination and indignation at injustice shapes 
the political world, such as E. P Thompson and Gramsci, are cited by Honneth as exceptions 
that prove the general rule. The break from the established social and methodological 
premises of early critical theory- ‘ideas for which there no longer seems to be any kind of 
resonance within the experience of the accelerating present’ (Honneth, 2009, p. 19)- is also 
sharply delineated. Although he frequently alludes to the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Benjamin he is emphatic that we must recognise that the historical context in which this work 
was developed has disappeared. He argues that the hopes that sustained the early twentieth 
century workers movement, the appalling brutality of Soviet power and the fear of a 
completely managed society in Western Europe, all key elements in the genesis of critical 
theory, no longer shape the social imagination or provide useful coordinates for intellectual 
work. Similarly, he distances himself from Habermas while acknowledging his intellectual 
debt to him and to Habermas’s ‘linguistic turn’ of critical theory (2005) arguing that cognitive 
rationalism with its emphasis on undistorted communication, is too cognitivist, too 
rationalistic and too abstract (too Kantian) and that he ignores the normative basis of 
capitalism.  
 
By engaging in the debate about the emphasis on justice as fairness or on justice as the 
normative ideal of free communication, as in Habermas, he argues more against this Kantian 
position coming from a Hegelian position arguing for a reinstatement of the ethical as against 
the Kantian moral criteria. He moves in the direction of Charles Taylor in this emphasis on 
the ‘good life’ rather than merely on the just life and; 
 Rooting it in the communal rather than abstract organization, concrete rather than  
 universal normative criteria, and substantive rather than procedural values which  
 highlight difference and uniqueness over the generality and similarity. 
      (Alexander & Pia Lara, 1996, p. 127) 
 
In his critique of this tradition Honneth asserts that the project of emancipatory philosophy 
has to be entirely reimagined. His solution to this challenge is to foreground a theory of 
intersubjectivity and the ‘struggle for recognition’ as the crucial mooring points for future 
efforts in critical theory. Honneth argues ‘the reproduction of social life is governed by the 
imperative of mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical relation-to-self only 
when one has learned to view oneself, from the normative perspective of one’s partners in 
interaction, as their social addressee (1995, p. 92). So in order for humans to achieve a 
productive relationship with themselves (an identity) humans require an intersubjective 
recognition of their abilities and achievements. This is the foundation of one’s moral 
consciousness and of society as a whole and one develops a morality in the context of the 
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reactions (positive and negative) one receives from another human being in the struggle for 
recognition. Honneth argues that the struggle for recognition, based on the need for self-
esteem and the experience of disrespect, also explains social development. ‘It is by the way of 
the morally motivated struggles of social groups-their collective attempt to establish, 
institutionally and culturally, expanded forms of recognition-that the normatively directional 
change of societies proceeds’ (1995, p. 92). 
 
This, of course, is part of a more general turn to issues of recognition and identity in  
the social sciences and philosophy (for instance in the work of Charles Taylor and Nancy 
Fraser etc) and a renewed concern with the ethical dimension of philosophy (ie MacIntyre). 
What distinguishes Honneth’s theory of recognition is the wide range of intellectual resources 
he deploys in developing his model, the ambition of the model in terms of his claims for its 
explanatory value, and his insistence on the continuing importance of emancipatory hope as a 
constituent part of social theory. He attempts to make a systematic connection between 
radical social critique and the best empirical research and thinking about our society. 
 
Honneth’s Theory of Recognition 
Honneth uses Hegel’s early Jena writings as the departure point for his theory of recognition, 
a combination of esteem and love. This theme was elaborated throughout the phases of 
Hegel’s work in distinct ways and is central to his concept Master and Slave  
 
 …the Lord achieves his recognition through another consciousness; for in  
 them, the other consciousness is expressly something unessential, both by its  
 working on the thing, and by it dependence on a specific existence. In neither  
 case can it be lord over the being of the thing and achieve absolute negation of  
 it. Here, therefore, is present this moment of recognition, viz. that the other  
 consciousness sets aside its own being-for-self, and in so doing itself does what  
 the first does to it….But for recognition proper the moment is lacking, that what the  
 lord does to the other he also does to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself  
 he should also do to the other. The outcome is a recognition that is one-sided and  
 unequal. (Hegel, 1998, p. 116) 
 
 
Hegel sees the intersubjective nature of identity formation as emerging in the context of one’s 
relationships or from the ways other persons encounter the self. This primarily takes place in 
the family, civil society and State. Each of these corresponds to a level of relation to one’s 
self. Morality, according to Hegel, is not received through divine revelation but in the context 
of the positive and negative feedback received in the struggle for recognition.  
 
Honneth develops this tripartite model but shifts the emphasis from institutions to broader 
social spheres. He argues that there are three differentiated recognition orders in modern 
society the development of which are crucial to understanding the dynamics and historical 
evolution of capitalism and modernity. Each social sphere is defined by the different forms of 
recognition needs and expectations. Recognition, a simultaneously individual and social need, 
requires love in the immediate interpersonal sphere for the ‘singular needy subject’ for the 
development of self-confidence; the recognition of the autonomous rights bearing person in 
law offers the basis for self-respect; and the successful formation of a co-operative member of 
society who efforts are socially valued is necessary to build self-esteem (Honneth in Honneth 
& Fraser, p 161). It should be noted that this is not simply an adaptation of Hegel for the 
twenty first century. The theory is layered, and also stripped of some of the metaphysical 
abstraction of German Idealist philosophy by an engagement with, sociology and psychology. 
In particular it relies on a reading of the work of George Herbert Mead, and the object 
relations psychology elaborated by Donald Winnicott and, less explicitly, a novel use of 
Foucault’s genealogy of modernity.  
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The first of the three forms of relating is self-confidence, according to Honneth, and is 
established and developed in the relationships of friendship and love and is based on the right 
to exist. If one experiences love an ability to love one’s self and others is developed. One is 
capable of forging an identity by receiving recognition from others. This is the process by 
which individuals individuate themselves as distinct from others. Without a special 
relationship with another person it is not possible to become aware of one’s own uniqueness 
and special characteristics. In this way a positive image of one’s abilities is developed. His 
concept of being ‘reconciled with others’ (Hegel) means that only by being recognised can we 
achieve an identity and this Hegelian concept of being reconciled with others was developed 
by both Dewey and Mead. This is also reminiscent of Bowlby’s Attachment Theory (Fleming, 
2008) which maps the relationships of trust that build a secure base for identity and are key to 
expressing one’s needs without fear of rejection. In the language of Erik Erikson and 
Winnicott these are the relationships that create trust through being accepted, recognised and 
support the expression of ones’ needs without fear of abandonment. These are also the 
preconditions for the formation of identity and morality. If this essential ingredient of 
development is not available or a negative message about self-worth is given then the 
outcome is a potential hiatus or missing piece in the personality that may seek and find 
‘expression through negative emotional reactions of shame or anger, offence or contempt’ 
(Honneth, 1995, p. 257). 
 
 
Hegel +  Contexts in which one 
develops ways of 
relating to self (or forms 
of social organisation 
Forms of 
Relating to 
Self (stages of 
identity 
development) 
One Can… Task for.. 
Family (love) Relations of friendship & 
love. personality 
Self-
confidence 
Care  Parents, 
carers  
Civil society 
(rights) 
Recognised as 
autonomous person with 
rights. Social 
Organization 
Self-respect Recognise 
legal rights 
School 
State 
(solidarity & 
recognition 
from work) or 
in AH  any 
community of 
affiliation 
Performance of ones 
freedom and autonomy 
through work = how the 
community values one’s 
contribution. Culture 
Self-esteem Recognise the 
contribution of 
others 
Society 
(incl adult 
and higher 
education) 
Table 1. Forms of relating to self as linked to Hegel and as understood by Honneth2 
 
 
The second type of relationship to self involves self-respect, when a person in a community of 
rights is given recognition as a morally and legally mature person. When a person is 
recognised at this level one is accepted as an autonomous person who has both a right and an 
ability to participate in the discussions and debates of the institution concerned, i.e. state or 
organisations. Respect is shown to other people by relating toward them as having rights. 
Without rights there is no respect. For some, e.g. Kant, the formation of the autonomous 
person is the main goal of education. The self-relation that is gained from the experience of 
being treated as such a mature person is self-respect. The price paid for the absence of this 
recognition is the absence of autonomy. Again this is clearly linked to the development and 
growth of discourses and practices that are specific to modernity and were articulated 
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differently in feudal societies. It is clear that the securing and development of the rights of the 
individual is viewed by Honneth as an important social gain indicating that he holds a more 
optimistic conception of modernity than the first generation of critical theorists.  
 
But this is not the highest form of recognition, according to Honneth. The missing part as to 
the performance of that autonomy through work and the dilemma for the person is whether 
the community will honour their contribution through work. The experience of being so 
honoured leads to a form of self-relation that Honneth calls self-esteem. People with high self 
esteem will reciprocate a mutual acknowledgement of each others contribution to the 
community and loyalty and solidarity grow from this (Honneth, 2007, p. 139).  
 Only through self-directed and autonomous work can one perform one’s  
 freedom of will. And only when one begins to work out one’s own free will  
for a common good can one become respected in a community (or the state in  
Hegelian terms). Self-esteem means that one sees one’s work being  
acknowledged and recognised.   (Huttunen, 2007, p. 426) 
 
In this way the individual becomes ‘recognised as a person whose capabilities are of 
constitutive value to a concrete community’ (Honneth, 1997, p. 20). This reciprocal and 
mutual recognition of each other through work becomes a strong feeling of solidarity in the 
community and such well recognised people are capable of being, as a result, strongly 
motivated. People earn self-esteem from society if their activities are in tune with society and 
society provides the basis on which they can become worthy members of society. 
 
It is not surprising to have three corresponding forms of disrespect, corresponding to the 
forms of respect. At an obvious level, if a child is neglected and humiliated they may loose 
self-confidence. If people are denied citizenship or denied rights their self-respect may suffer 
and finally if one’s way of life is not recognised or respected then damage is done to one’s 
self-esteem. For these reasons abuse, insults, ignoring people will not only be an injustice (it 
will harm people and deny their civil rights) but injuries are done to their understanding of 
themselves, their identity. If one, for instance, only receives feedback when a mistake is 
made, one’s self esteem will not develop. Mudslinging or other forms of ‘put down’ are so 
often the result of low self-esteem from the source of the insult. 
 
Forms of 
relating to 
self 
Forms of 
recognition 
Forms of disrespect Component of 
personality 
 
Self 
Confidence 
Parent secure 
attachment & love 
and care 
Neglect, abuse, 
emotional neglect 
Physical integrity 
& psychological 
damage  
 
Self-respect Legal rights Violation of legal 
rights, civil and 
human rights and 
employment rights 
Social integrity 
And treated as an 
object 
 
Self-esteem Community of 
practice, respect & 
solidarity 
Bullying, ignoring, 
excluding, constant 
negative feedback 
Honour, dignity,   
Table 2 Honneth on Forms of relating to self and forms of recognition 
 
 
Justice, Redistribution and Recognition: Honneth’s debate with Nancy Fraser 
Locating the source of conflict and social progress in the struggle for recognition Honneth 
consciously breaks with Kantian influenced procedural ethics, promoted most famously by 
John Rawls, which has been so influential in contemporary debates about justice. As noted 
earlier it also marks a theoretical rupture with some of the key premises of Marxist and 
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Marxist influenced social theory that have stressed the importance of economic processes in 
social reproduction and have largely regarded talk of the mobilising force of moral values as a 
distraction from the issue of uncovering exploitation. Nancy Fraser, another critical theorist 
strongly influenced by feminism, who has also elaborated a model of how identity formation 
and recognition might be understood in relation to economic justice, has taken up some of 
these important issues in an extended debate with Honneth (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). This 
philosophically rich and provocative debate offers a useful departure point to begin to assess 
the strengths and weaknesses of Honneth’s theory. 
 
Honneth claims that the struggle for recognition lies behind all major social conflicts and that 
the conflicts over distribution of goods and wealth is (contrary to Fraser) ‘locked into the 
struggle for recognition’ (Honneth, 2001, p. 54). Fraser’s response is that this is too monistic 
and too subjectivist and that social struggles are better understood from a dual perspective 
which includes both recognition and distributive elements. This ‘dual perspective’ position 
synthesises the models of justice developed by the workers movement and by the new social 
movements (feminism, the ecological and peace movement etc). Honneth replies that the 
model is too concerned with what has been made known already by social groups and ignores 
both hidden injustices and he is;  
 
 convinced that the terms of recognition must represent the unified  
 framework for such a project….Critical Theory, under present conditions, 
does better to orient itself by the categorical framework of a sufficiently  
differentiated theory of recognition, since this establishes a link between the  
social causes of wide-spread feelings of injustice and the normative objectives  
of emancipatory movements.  
(Honneth 2003, p. 113) 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
There are a number of areas in which these ideas have implications. Few of these have been 
addressed in the literature of adult education and the discussion here is to outline (rather than 
discuss fully) the possible implications.  
 
Understanding adult’s experience of self-confidence 
The ways in which adults experience returning to education is often framed in the language or 
narrative of increased self-confidence. We are of the view that these theoretical ideas of 
Honneth about the importance of self-confidence and self-esteem enable us to understand (or 
interpret) what adult students experience. More importantly it allows us to see that closely 
connected to the experience of increased self-confidence there is a development of one’s 
identity based on the increased self-recognition. While it may be interesting to assert this 
connection it provides an important research agenda or research task to ascertain a more in-
depth understanding of the experience of self-confidence. 
 
Sensitising concept set for interpreting narratives of students – RANLHE 
Narrative research is a recognised research methodology for making visible the acts of 
recognition and misrecognition (disrespect) that are part of social interactions (Huttunen, 
2008, p. 89) 
 
The narratives [in the RANLHE research at NUI Maynooth] tell of a significant number of 
students in higher education who have stories of increased self-esteem. Not only do they hold 
education, teachers, well-educated and articulate people in high esteem but they want to be 
held in high esteem themselves. A typical comment that students make to underline their 
motivation for participation in higher education makes this kind of statement:  
I hold the position of teacher in esteem. It is a job of esteem and I still feel that. When  
you are working class, you look for esteem…we held teacher, priest and garda  
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[police] sergeant in esteem. I had the perception that these are positions of  
recognition. I was probably looking for that.  
 
It is implied in the work of Honneth that such a pursuit is a process of identity development 
and increases the forms of respect and recognition that are available to the student. The way 
in which these are bestowed on the student imply that there is a social dimension as a society 
or community is, through the validation and qualification of higher education, acknowledging 
and respecting the individual in ways that issue in increased social solidarity and respect. This 
is a process of identity development. 
 
The tantalising possibility is being presented here that self-confidence, self-respect and 
self-esteem or indeed the environments in which these forms of respect are created, 
supported and enhanced are really the habitus (or dispositions) that contribute to 
successful participation (retention) in Higher Education. 
 
Honneth’s work can clearly be usefully seen with and against the work of Pierre Bourdieu on 
symbolic violence, misrecognition, cultural capital and habitus. Of key importance in any 
such discussion is how one understands the source, dynamics and ‘rewards’ of social struggle, 
an issue which has recently been explored with considerable acuity (Sayer, 2005) A fruitful 
discussion of these issues in relation to Alheit’s (1996) and Merrill’s (1999) research would 
usefully draw out a number of these issues. 
 
Link attachment theory and communicative action through recognition 
It is an important part of adult learning to come to know the mechanisms, dynamics and 
competencies of giving and receiving recognition. It is important because the alternative 
undermines motivation to work constructively, reduces productivity and in addition individual 
identity formation and development are undermined. In this way the political and the personal 
are intimately connected. We are inclined to see the lifelong pursuit of recognition as 
analogous to Bowlby’s often forgotten claim that the pursuit of secure attachments is a 
lifelong process. We are of this view because the dynamics of constructing a secure 
attachment in children involve the recognition by the carer of the child’s need for security.  
 
There is general acceptance among researchers on attachment theory that the sense of a secure 
attachment is connected with a positive mental representation of others, self-esteem and an 
ability to rely on one’s own constructive ways of coping in times of stress (Fraley & Shaver, 
2008). The pursuit of a secure attachment style and internal working models that Bowlby 
described as a lifelong project is now potentially a staged process of giving and receiving 
recognition and respect that has the same dividend as Bowlby’s lifelong project. In this view 
justice, care, recognition and respect are integrated in one project that has significant potential 
for the individual and for society. This is supported in a review by Mikulincer & Shaver 
(2005) confirming that secure attachments are important in achieving self-recognition. Clearly 
the work of West (1996) is relevant to these issues. 
 
This raises the possibility that lifelong learning is being redefined as a more basic human need 
and a fundamental developmental project than the version found in the dominant narratives 
and discourses of public policy. 
 
A new dimension for lifelong learning as learning for democracy 
An education that is strategic and interested in strategic knowledge or strategic teaching treats 
students as objects, knowledge as facts to be imparted and is instrumental in its philosophical 
orientation. Communicative education in contrast is critical of presuppositions; aims to create 
an ideal speech situation in which the force of the better argument is the only force and in 
which all have full and equal rights to participate in a discursive form of democratic will-
formation. Respect is the essence of this approach to education, learning and teaching. The 
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form of democracy being proposed is not that of liberal democracy as found in the modern 
world or of representative democracy either.  
 
 Today, these key terms ordinarily designate two normative models of  
 democracy whose common goal it is to give democratic will formation a  
 greater role than is usual in political liberalism. Instead of limiting the  
 participatory activity of citizens to the function of periodically legitimating the  
 state's exercise of power, this activity is to be a permanent matter embodied in  
 the democratic sphere and should be able to be understood as the source of all  
 political decision-making processes. 
        (Honneth, 1998, p. 1) 
 
Liberal democracy according to Honneth (2007, p. 218) involves ‘limiting the participatory 
activities of citizens to the function of periodically legitimating the state’s exercise of power.’ 
The proposed democracy is nearer that proposed by Dewey  in Democracy and Education 
(1916) and The Public and its Problems (1989). 
 
Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition outlines how the formation of a democratic personality 
(see also Biesta, 2007) requires the three forms of self-relation. We need caring and loving 
individuals and these are produced through and by those with self-confidence. It requires a 
good recognition of the reciprocal nature of legal rights and, as one might anticipate, only a 
person who possesses self-respect (the capacity to know one’s own rights) can recognise the 
rights of others. And thirdly, a democratic society requires the reciprocal recognition of work 
and again, only a person with good levels of self-esteem can recognise the contribution of 
others. If care and self-confidence are learned originally in the family and self-respect the 
product of schooling and education one is led to ask how in a modern world one can acquire 
self-esteem. It may be achieved as part of the normal interaction between adults in a 
functioning society but the thought is also worth exploring as to whether the achievement of 
adult education is capable of being identified as contributing to self-esteem too. Now the 
possibility of naming the original question of this paper about the achievements of adults that 
are articulated as increased self-confidence, self-respect and possibly that of self-esteem – all 
crucial for the formation of a functioning democracy. 
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